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Fundamental Versus Deferential: 
Appellate Review of Terminations of Parental Rights 
KAREN A. WYLE* 
Any attorney who handles or follows cases involving termination of parental 
rights will have often read, “This court has long had a highly deferential standard of 
review in cases concerning the termination of parental rights.”1 This article 
addresses several questions that arise from that familiar language: 
 Does the Indiana Court of Appeals in fact have a tradition or practice of 
highly deferential review of termination orders? 
 Is this deference greater than the court accords to trial court decisions in 
other family law matters or in non-family civil appeals? 
 If so, on what legal analysis is this special deference based? 
 Is it appropriate to give more deference to a trial court’s decision to 
forever sever the bonds between parent and child than to other trial court 
decisions, in and outside the area of family law? 
As shown below, the court is in fact significantly more likely to affirm 
termination orders than any other kind of civil judgments, including judgments in 
other family law matters. The Rules of Appellate Procedure also operate to increase 
the difficulties encountered in appeals of termination orders. This especially 
unfavorable treatment, however, rests on the slenderest of legal foundations and 
raises grave constitutional concerns. The challenge is to find an effective and 
practical way to move toward an appropriate level of appellate scrutiny in 
termination appeals. 
I. AFFIRMANCE VS. REVERSAL RATES IN THE VARIOUS TYPES OF CIVIL APPEALS 
The threshold question to be determined is whether, in fact, the Indiana Court of 
Appeals gives any special deference to trial court decisions to terminate parental 
rights. A review of Indiana Court of Appeals decisions, both published and 
unpublished, from March 1, 2008, through November 30, 2009,2 reveals the 
following:  
                                                                                                                 
 
        *   Solo appellate practitioner, Bloomington, IN.  J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., 
Stanford University. 
 1.  See, e.g., In re K.S. 750 N.E.2d 852, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). 
 2.  See Indiana Appellate opinions Archive – Appeals, Indiana Courts, 
IN.GOV/JUDICIARY, available at http://www.ai.org/judiciary/opinions/archapp.html 
[hereinafter Appellate Opinions Archive]. Official statistics showing the reversal rate in 
Indiana Court of Appeals decisions in different sorts of civil appeals do not appear to be 
available. The following tables are based on a review of decisions accessible through the 
court’s archived opinions, available online at http://www.ai.org/judiciary/opinions/archapp. 
html, for the dates indicated. (The tabulated cases do not include opinions on rehearing.) 
These tables do not represent highly rigorous or technically unassailable methods. The 
occasional clerical error in recording decisions is not only possible, but likely. Others 
reviewing the same cases might come to different conclusions as to whether a reversal was 
primarily on substantive or on procedural grounds, or whether a case should be categorized 
as “family law” or “non-family civil.” Others might divide the decisions into different, 
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 Total Affirmed Reversed/ 
Partially 
Reversed/ 
Remanded, 
Substantive 
Grounds 
Reversed/Partially 
Reversed/Remanded, 
Procedural Grounds 
Civil Not Family 
Law, Published 
477 267 160 50 
Civil Not Family 
Law, Not Published 
492 362 97 33 
Family Law Not 
TPR, Published 
91 38 42 11 
Family Law Not 
TPR, Not Published 
272 184 71 17 
TPR, Published 25 16  5  4 
TPR, Not Published 198 194*  3  1 
 
*The Indiana Supreme Court reversed one of these memorandum decisions in In 
re G.Y.3  
 
Those numbers converted into approximate percentage terms are as follows: 
 Total Affirmed Reversed/Partially 
Reversed/ 
Remanded, 
Substantive 
Grounds 
Reversed/Partially 
Reversed/Remanded, 
Procedural Grounds 
Civil Not Family 
Law, Published 
477 56% 33.5% 10.5% 
Civil Not Family 
Law, Not Published 
492 73.6% 19.7% 6.7% 
Family Law Not 
TPR, Published 
91 41.8% 46.2% 12.1% 
Family Law Not 
TPR, Not Published 
272 67.65% 26.1% 6.25% 
TPR, Published 25 64% 20% 16% 
TPR, Not Published 198 98% 1.5% 0.5% 
                                                                                                                 
possibly more illuminating, categories. A more determined researcher might include 
decisions back to August 21, 2006, when the court apparently began making unpublished 
memorandum decisions available online (see http://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/nfp.html) 
or might find some methodology that would include published decisions before that date. 
These tables are intended only to provide a first, rough overview that could either support or 
rebut the proposition that the court is more deferential in termination cases. 
 3.  In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. 2009). 
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Those numbers divided more generally are as follows: 
 Total Affirmed 
(numbers) 
Affirmed 
(percentages) 
All Civil Not Family Law 969 629 64.91% 
All Family Law Not TPR 363 222 61.16% 
All Termination of Parental 
Rights 
223 210 94.17% 
 
First, we see that in civil cases other than termination cases slightly fewer than 
two-thirds of all judgments are affirmed. Breaking down these numbers, one might 
expect that decisions in family law cases would be affirmed more often than in 
other civil cases. After all,  
[O]ur supreme court has expressed a “preference for granting latitude 
and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.” In re Marriage 
of Richardson, 622 N.E.2d 178, 178 (Ind. 1993). The rationale for this 
deference is that appellate courts “are in a poor position to look at a 
cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge . . . did 
not properly understand the significance of the evidence, or that he 
should have found its preponderance or the inferences therefrom to be 
different from what he did.” Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 
2002) (citation omitted).4 
However, if one excludes termination cases, we see that in the sample period fewer 
family law judgments were affirmed than other civil judgments: 61.16% (41.76% 
of published and 67.65% of unpublished decisions) versus 64.91% (55.97% of 
published and 73.77% of unpublished decisions).  
Only in termination appeals is the rhetoric of deference to the trial court fully 
matched by the reality. Within the sample, the court of appeals affirmed almost 
95% of all orders terminating parental rights (64% of published and a whopping 
97.98%—194 out of 198—of unpublished decisions).5 Of the 13 termination orders 
that the court reversed, 5 were reversed for procedural reasons, such as the ill-timed 
withdrawal of counsel6 or inadequate notice of the termination hearing7—leaving 
                                                                                                                 
 
 4.  Paternity of J.J., 911 N.E.2d 725, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); see also Walker v. 
Nelson, 911 N.E.2d 124, 127 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); Apter v. Ross, 781 N.E.2d 744, 757 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2003).  
 5.  For all types of cases, reversals are more likely in published than in unpublished 
cases. Publication is much less frequent in termination cases than in all other civil cases. 
Whether this introduces a bias against reversals, based on something other than the nature of 
termination cases, depends on whether the frequency of publication is linked to the 
infrequency of reversals in these cases. 
 6.  K.S. v. Marion Cnty. Dep’t of Child Servs., 917 N.E.2d 158, 164-65 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2009). 
 7.  R.T. v. Dep’t of Child Servs., 911 N.E.2d 577, 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 
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only 8 out of 223 termination orders (5 in published cases, 3 in unpublished) 
reversed on such grounds as insufficient evidence.8 
In addition to this track record, we may look at the unique treatment given to 
termination appeals in the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure. Indiana Appellate 
Rule 35 governs motions for extensions of time.9 Subsection (C) is titled 
Proceedings in Which Extensions are Prohibited and reads as follows: 
No motion for extension of time shall be granted to file a Petition for Rehearing, a 
Petition to Transfer to the Supreme Court, any brief supporting or responding to 
such Petitions, or in appeals involving termination of parental rights.10  
 
Prior to 2007, termination appeals were treated the same way as “appeals 
involving worker’s compensation, issues of child custody, support, visitation, 
paternity, adoption, [and] determination that a child is in need of services.”11 
Extensions of time were only available for such appeals “in extraordinary 
circumstances.”12 Where termination appeals were concerned, this was in accord 
with the recommendations of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court 
Judges’ Adoption and Permanency Guidelines.13 Effective January 1, 2007, 
termination appeals were removed from Rule 35(D) and were relegated to Rule 
35(C), which until then had prohibited extensions of time only for Petitions for 
Rehearing, Transfer or Review14, or briefs supporting such petitions. In termination 
cases, but in no other sort of appeal, if the rule is taken at face value,15 there are no 
circumstances that will result in an extension of time to file a brief or other paper. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8.  The numbers are similar following the sample period. See Appellate Opinions 
Archive, supra note 2. Between November 30, 2009, and November 23, 2010, the court of 
appeals issued decisions in 118 appeals of termination orders. Four were published opinions, 
two affirming and two reversing. Of the 114 unpublished memorandum decisions, 113 
affirmed the termination of parental rights, with the sole reversal coming on procedural 
grounds. One of these unpublished decisions, issued December 10, 2009, was reversed on 
transfer. In re I.A., No. 62S01-1003-JV-148, slip op. (Ind. Oct. 5, 2010). 
 9.  IND. R. APP. P. 35. 
 10.  IND. R. APP. P. 35(C) (emphasis added). 
 11.  IND. R. APP. P. 35(D) (2006) (repealed 2007). 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, ADOPTION AND 
PERMANENCY GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 
CASES, 38–39 (2000). 
 14.  The current rule concerning extensions of time for petitions for review is Ind. 
Appellate Rule 63(K). 
 15.  Whether this rule is being uniformly and strictly enforced is a question for another 
researcher. However, in one termination appeal where circumstances strongly supported an 
extension of time to file a brief, and where the appellant challenged the constitutionality of 
Rule 35(C) if applied, the court essentially reset the 30-day clock, giving the appellant 30 
days from the time when counsel obtained access to certain portions of the Clerk’s record. 
See Stedman v. Greene County Dept. of Child Services, No. 28A05-0707-JV-361, 2008 WL 
732573 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2008) (referenced order issued Sept. 18, 2007). 
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II. PRECEDENT OR RATIONALE FOR SPECIAL DEFERENCE 
What, then, is the basis for this special deference to trial court determinations in 
termination appeals? 
The case most often cited for the court’s deferential standard of review is In re 
K.S.16 In fact, since K.S. was published, every decision this author has found, 
published or unpublished, setting forth this deferential standard of review relies on 
K.S. or on a case that is derived directly from K.S. 17  
The key language in K.S. is the statement that “[the court of appeals] has long 
had a highly deferential standard of review in cases concerning the termination of 
parental rights.”18 K.S. does not cite any case immediately following this 
statement.19 Shortly thereafter, it cites a single case, In re L.S.20 L.S. is a termination 
appeal, but it does not describe any longstanding tradition of singling out 
termination cases for special deference.21 L.S. states that “[i]n deference to the trial 
court's unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the judgment 
terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous.”22 This is 
language similar to that found in other family law cases and indeed in every type of 
Indiana appeal.23  
L.S. cites Egly v. Blackford County Dep't of Public Welfare,24 also a termination 
appeal, which states that “[w]here the trial court has heard the evidence and has had 
the opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses, we will not set aside the 
judgment unless it is clearly erroneous.”25 Egly is better known for overruling what 
had been the standard for termination of parental rights, namely that parental 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16.  See generally In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).  
 17.  E.g., In re I.A.,903 N.E.2d 146, 152–53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); R.W., Sr. v. Marion 
Cnty. Dep’t of Child Servs., 892 N.E.2d 239, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); In re L.B., 889 
N.E.2d 326, 336 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); In re A.B., 888 N.E.2d 231, 235 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); 
In re A.J., 877 N.E.2d 805, 815 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Office 
of Family and Children, 841 N.E.2d 615, 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); . For cases citing these 
K.S.-derived cases, see, e.g., L.B. v. Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs., No. 42A01-0906-JV-267 
at 6 (Nov. 30, 2009); T.J. v. Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs., No. 49A02-0812-JV-1071 at 8 
(June 5, 2009); Elizabethe G. v. Dep’t of Child Servs., 906 N.E.2d 248, 250–51 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2009); In re Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of A.R., No. 
49A02-JV-360 at 12 (Feb. 27, 2007). 
 18.  In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d at 836. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. See generally In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). 
 21.  In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  See, e.g., Bowles v. Bowles, 261 N.E.2d 228, 230 (Ind. 1970);Ruse v. Bleeke, 914 
N.E.2d 1, 7–8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)); State v. Holley, 899 
N.E.2d 31, 33 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); Atterholt v. Robinson, 872 N.E.2d 633, 639 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2007); Rogers v. Rogers, 876 N.E.2d 1121, 1126–27 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Apter v. 
Ross, 781 N.E.2d 744, 757 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 
 24.  In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.  
 25.  Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dep’t of Public Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1234–35 (Ind. 
1992). 
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custody must be “wholly inadequate for [the children’s] very survival.”26 Egly cites 
In re Wardship of B.C.,27 another termination appeal. B.C. states the  
well established and acknowledged rule that when we review a case in 
which a trial court has rendered findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
we will not set aside that court’s judgment unless it is clearly 
erroneous. Furthermore, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor 
reassess the credibility of the witnesses. To do otherwise would be to 
substitute our judgment for that of the trial judge.28  
This chain of cases does no more than invoke, in the termination context, the usual 
Indiana standard for appellate review of factual findings.29  
Research has not disclosed any Indiana case law prior to K.S. comparable to the 
key language in K.S. or on which K.S. could reasonably be said to rely without 
attribution—let alone any case thoroughly discussing and analyzing the issue. 
It thus appears that Indiana case law provides no special justification for 
deferring substantially more to trial court orders terminating parental rights than to 
other trial court judgments that rely on evidence and witnesses.30 Yet as we have 
seen, that is what routinely takes place. 
III. APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF APPELLATE SCRUTINY IN TERMINATION APPEALS 
Whether or not Indiana’s current approach to termination appeals is based on a 
considered analysis, is there anything wrong with it? Should termination appeals be 
treated differently from other civil and/or family law appeals—either as they now 
are or in some other way?  
These are appeals from the termination—the permanent and complete 
deprivation—of parental rights.31 The Supreme Court has spoken repeatedly and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 26.  See id. at 1234. 
 27.  Id. See generally In re Wardship of B.C, 441 N.E.2d 208 (Ind. 1982). 
 28.  In re Wardship of B.C., 441 N.E.2d. at 211 (emphasis added). 
 29.  See, e.g., Canteen Service Company of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Indiana Dep't of 
Transportation, 932 N.E.2d 749, 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 
 30.  In re Johnson., 690 N.E.2d 716, 721 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), refers to the court’s 
“deferential standard of review,” but does not state that this standard applies especially in 
termination cases, let alone justify such a distinction. 
 31.  Theoretically, the same standards apply if the State appeals a trial court’s refusal to 
terminate parental rights. Practically speaking, this situation rarely arises in Indiana. (For 
examples—possibly the only examples—of such appeals, see In re J.M., 908 N.E.2d 191 
(Ind. 2009); Crawford Cnty. Dep’t, of Child Servs. v. T.G., No. 13A05-0807-JV-414 (Ind. 
Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2008); see also Marion Cnty. Office of Family and Children v. Qualls, 745 
N.E.2d 904 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), remanded in part to determine whether the trial court 
denied or simply ignored the petition to terminate the father’s rights.) Whether the paucity of 
State appeals in termination cases reflects the rarity of State losses at trial, or some other 
factor, is unclear. In the states, see infra text accompanying notes 52–60, where trial court 
decisions in termination cases are reviewed de novo, the State is sometimes the one to 
benefit from such review—particularly in Oregon, where trial courts seem to be more 
reluctant to terminate parental rights. 
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eloquently about the fundamental and constitutionally protected nature of parental 
rights: 
 Lassiter declared it “plain beyond the need for multiple citation” that 
a natural parent’s “desire for and right to ‘the companionship, care, 
custody, and management of his or her children’” is an interest far more 
precious than any property right. 452 U.S., at 27, quoting Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S., at 651. When the State initiates a parental rights 
termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental 
liberty interest, but to end it. “If the State prevails, it will have worked a 
unique kind of deprivation. . . . A parent's interest in the accuracy and 
justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is, 
therefore, a commanding one.” 452 U.S., at 27. 
 . . . Few forms of state action are both so severe and so 
irreversible.32 
 . . . The importance of this interest cannot easily be overstated. Few 
consequences of judicial action are so grave as the severance of natural 
family ties. Even the convict committed to prison and thereby deprived 
of his physical liberty often retains the love  and support of family 
members.33 
This language has been echoed in other relevant case law: 
The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The 
rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed 
“essential, ” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), “basic civil 
rights of man, ” Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and 
“[r]ights far more precious . . . than property rights,” May v. Anderson, 
345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953). . . . The integrity of the family unit has found 
protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, at 399, the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, at 541, and the 
Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) 
(Goldberg, J., concurring).34 
These principles are far from new, and as the Supreme Court has noted, they 
relate to some of the most historically significant liberty interests.  
The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents in the 
care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the 
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.35 
These cases are not speaking solely of the parent’s, but of the child’s familial 
rights. “[T]he child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous 
                                                                                                                 
 
 32.  Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982) (omission in original). 
 33.  Id. at 787 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 34.  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (omission added). 
 35.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).  
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termination of their natural relationship”36 While the State and the child share an 
obvious interest in protecting the child’s welfare and safety, “the State registers no 
gain towards its declared goals when it separates children from the custody of fit 
parents.”37 
A customary justification for termination proceedings is the child’s need for 
stability, which is thought to be best served by a permanent and final disposition.38 
However, termination may not lead to any permanent and stable environment. 
While the State must show that it has “a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment 
of the child,”39 this plan “need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of 
the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is 
terminated.”40 In particular, the State is not required to show that there is an 
adoptive home waiting—it is sufficient under current case law if the State intends 
to attempt adoptive placement.41 
Aside from the subject matter, we must consider the trial court proceedings that 
have culminated in the termination appeal. Are they more likely than other civil 
proceedings to result in fair and accurate findings and conclusions? In Santosky, a 
case involving due process issues that arise in termination hearings, the Supreme 
Court lists factors that suggest otherwise: 
At such a proceeding, numerous factors combine to magnify the risk of 
erroneous factfinding. Permanent neglect proceedings employ 
imprecise substantive standards that leave determinations unusually 
open to the subjective values of the judge. In appraising the nature and 
quality of a complex series of encounters among the agency, the 
parents, and the child, the court possesses unusual discretion to 
underweigh probative facts that might favor the parent. Because parents 
subject to termination proceedings are often poor, uneducated, or 
members of minority groups, such proceedings are often vulnerable to 
judgments based on cultural or class bias.  
  . . . [T]he primary witnesses at the hearing will be the agency's own 
professional caseworkers whom the State has empowered both to 
investigate the family situation and to testify against the parents. 
Indeed, because the child is already in agency custody, the State even 
                                                                                                                 
 
 36.  Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760. 
 37.  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 652. 
 38.  See, e.g., In re A.J., 877 N.E.2d 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); McBride v. Monroe 
Cnty. Office of Family and Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). The Court 
of Appeals has held that while “stability of environment is an important factor. . . . this in 
and of itself is not a valid basis for terminating the relationship between the natural parent 
and the children.” Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Office of Family and Children, 841 N.E.2d 
615, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); see also In re H.T., 901 N.E.2d 1118, 1122 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2009) (quoting Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Office of Family and Children, 841 N.E.2d 
615, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).  
 39.  IND. CODE § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(D) (2010). 
 40.  In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); see also In re D.D., 804 
N.E.2d 258, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 
 41.  In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d at 204; Lang v. Stark Cnty. Office of Family and Children, 
861 N.E.2d 366, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). 
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has the power to shape the historical events that form the basis for 
termination.42 
The dissenting Justices in Santosky defended the New York procedures at bar, 
pointing out that New York’s practice was to assign a single judge to handle the 
case “from the initial temporary removal of the child to the final termination of 
parental rights.”43 Thus, “decisions in termination cases are made by judges steeped 
in the background of the case and peculiarly able to judge the accuracy of evidence 
placed before them.”44 Whether in fact the judges, despite their large caseloads and 
the possible use of commissioners or magistrates, had such detailed knowledge of 
each case is perhaps debatable. In Indiana, according to knowledgeable 
practitioners, while it is common to assign all juvenile cases to a single judge, there 
are frequently different commissioners or magistrates handling the CHINS (Child 
in Need of Services) phase and the termination phase. Nor would the assignment of 
a single judge address the other factors identified by the Santosky majority: the 
imprecise nature of the key factual determinations, the resulting likelihood of 
subjective judgment, and the State’s role in shaping events and evidence. 
Santosky concerned the standard of proof to be applied in termination hearings, 
mandating at least a clear and convincing evidence standard.45 Indiana has, of 
course, adopted this standard.46 However, a standard of proof loses much of its 
value if a reviewing court does not apply sufficient scrutiny to enforce it. Due 
process in termination cases, as much as or more than other civil cases, depends 
upon “the error-reducing power of . . . appellate review.”47 Applying a more 
deferential standard in termination appeals dilutes that power. 
Deference to the trial court’s decision is certainly easier and faster than is 
careful scrutiny of the court’s conclusions.  
But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and 
efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, 
and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to 
protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing 
concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy 
government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.48 
IV. ALTERNATIVES 
There are several possibilities for ensuring that orders terminating parental 
rights receive adequate appellate scrutiny. The least complex, though not 
necessarily the easiest to implement, is simply to acknowledge that there is no 
sufficient basis for the “highly deferential” standard of review and to treat 
                                                                                                                 
 
 42.  Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762–63 (1982) (citations and footnotes omitted). 
 43.  Id. at 786 n.12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 746. 
 46.  IND. CODE § 31-34-12-2 (2010).  
 47.  Santosky, 455 U.S. at 776 n. 4 (Rehnquist, JJ, dissenting). 
 48.  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972). 
38 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL SUPPLEMENT [Vol. 86:29 
 
termination appeals like most other appeals. The latter element involves changing 
the habits or culture at the court.49  
Alternately, Indiana could acknowledge the fundamental nature of the 
relationships at stake by affording termination appeals greater scrutiny than appeals 
generally receive. This could be accomplished by judicial decision, statute, or 
rulemaking.  
Under Indiana Appellate Rule 4(A)(1), the Indiana Supreme Court, rather than 
the court of appeals, has mandatory and exclusive jurisdiction over the following 
cases:  
 
   (a) Criminal Appeals in which a sentence of death or life 
imprisonment without parole is imposed under Ind. Code § 35-
50-2-9 and Criminal Appeals in post conviction relief cases in 
which the sentence was death. 
   (b) Appeals of Final Judgments declaring a state or federal 
statute unconstitutional in whole or in part. 
   (c) Appeals involving waiver of parental consent to abortion 
under Rule 62. 
   (d) Appeals involving mandate of funds under Trial Rule 
60.5(B) and Rule 61.50 
The appeals covered in subsection (c) are in some ways comparable to termination 
appeals, in that they involve aspects of parental rights; although in other ways—in 
particular, the need for the utmost speed in reaching a final resolution—they are 
distinguishable. Termination appeals could conceivably be added to this list. 
One important, and probably decisive, objection to adding termination appeals 
to this list is logistical. The purpose of the 2001 reduction of the supreme court’s 
mandatory criminal jurisdiction was to allow the supreme court to devote adequate 
attention to shaping Indiana law in a variety of subject areas.51 If termination orders 
continued to be issued with anything like the current frequency, mandatory 
supreme court jurisdiction over such orders would once again limit the court’s 
ability to attend to the full spectrum of legal issues. It may, of course, be argued 
that the number of termination orders is itself problematic. However, the systemic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 49.  This change might be easier to accomplish if accompanied by some systemic 
changes. The court has recently conducted a pilot program whereby termination appeals 
were assigned to a single staff attorney. Telephone Interview with Judge Melissa May, 
Indiana Court of Appeals, Fourth District (2010). The goal was presumably to develop 
expertise and increase efficiency. The court has decided to continue with this program, while 
leaving it up to each judge to decide whether to send termination appeals to that staff 
attorney. Such a concentration of responsibility for termination cases could be used to ease 
the transition to a more rigorous scrutiny of termination orders. In order to ensure a 
sufficiently thorough review of the record, two or more staff attorneys could focus on 
termination cases. 
50.  IND. R. APP. P. 4(A)(1)(a)–(d). 
 51.  Kevin W. Betz & P. Jason Stephenson, An Examination of the Indiana Supreme 
Court Docket, Dispositions, and Voting in 2002, 36 IND. L. REV. 919, 919–20 (2003); 
Randall Shepard, Why Changing the Supreme Court’s Mandatory Jurisdiction is Critical to 
Lawyers and Clients, 33 IND. L. REV. 1101, 1102–04 (2000).  
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changes necessary to achieve any substantial reduction in such orders would be 
complex, probably controversial and would take some time to accomplish. 
Another possibility is for Indiana to adopt, for termination appeals, a procedure 
used in several other states in some or all equity cases: de novo appellate review of 
factual findings.  
The Iowa Court of Appeals reviews all equity cases de novo.52 The reviewing 
court is “obliged to examine the entire record and adjudicate rights anew on the 
issues properly presented.”53 It has also been established that “especially when 
considering the credibility of witnesses, the court gives weight to the fact findings 
of the district court, but is not bound by them.”54 Iowa’s appellate rules treat 
termination and “child-in-need-of-assistance” (CINA) cases differently from other 
appeals in some respects, with the differences generally aimed at expediting such 
appeals.55 However, the de novo standard still applies.56 In addition, the usual 
procedure allowing counsel to withdraw from what is considered a frivolous appeal 
does not apply in termination and CINA cases.57 
Under Nebraska law,  
In all appeals from the district court in suits in equity in which review 
of some or all of the findings of fact of the district court is asked by the 
appellant, it shall be the duty of the court of appeals or the supreme 
court to retry the issue or issues of fact involved in the finding or 
findings of fact complained of upon the evidence preserved in the bill 
of exceptions and, upon trial de novo of such question or questions of 
fact, reach an independent conclusion as to what finding or findings are 
required under the pleadings and all the evidence without reference to 
the conclusion reached in the district court or the fact that there may be 
some evidence in support thereof.58 
Juvenile cases, including termination cases, fall under this de novo review 
standard.59 As in Iowa, the reviewing court gives some consideration to the trial 
court’s opportunity to observe witnesses.60  
                                                                                                                 
 
 52.  IOWA R. APP. P. 6.907.  
 53.  In re Marriage of Geil, 509 N.W.2d 738, 740 (Iowa 1993).  
 54.  IOWA R. APP. P. 6.904(3)(g); see also In re K.C., 660 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Iowa 2003).  
 55.  See IOWA R. APP. P. 6.101(1)(a), 6.101(2)(a), 6.102(1), 6.104(1)(b)(1), 6.201(1)–
(2), 6.803(3)(b), 6.902(1) (also expediting certain other appeals, most of them involving 
children), 6.1103(1)(a), 6.1103(2)(a), 6.1208(2).  
 56.  See, e.g., In re S.J., 451 N.W.2d 827, 830 (Iowa 1990); In re H.L.B.R., 567 N.W.2d 
675, 677 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997); In re J.R., 478 N.W.2d 409, 411 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991). In 
recent years, termination orders are typically reversed in unpublished decisions. See, e.g., In 
re L.R., No. 09-1544 (Iowa. Ct. App. Jan.22, 2010); In re S.C., No. 09-0779 (Iowa Ct. App. 
Jul. 22, 2009); In re M.M., No. 02-1635 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 29,2003). 
 57.  IOWA R. APP. P. 6.1005(1). 
 58.  NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1925 (2004) (Scope of Review—in general); see, e.g., Estate 
of McElwee v. Omaha Transit Auth., 664 N.W.2d 461, 466 (Neb. 2003). But see State ex rel 
Medlin v. Little, 703 N.W.2d 593, 597 (Neb. 2005). 
 59.  See, e.g., In re Kenna S., 766 N.W.2d 424, 429 (Neb. Ct. App. 2009); In re Heather 
G., 664 N.W.2d 488, 497 (Neb. Ct. App. 2003).  
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Missouri applies an intermediate standard. While its appellate courts do not 
review equity judgments de novo, they may reverse such judgments if they are 
deemed “against the weight of the evidence.”61  
“Appellate courts should exercise [this] power . . . with caution and with a firm 
belief that the decree or judgment is wrong.”62 The reviewing courts generally defer 
to the trial court’s determinations of credibility.63  
Tennessee, while describing its appellate review in non-jury cases as de novo, 
applies a standard similar to Missouri’s: “A reviewing court must review the trial 
court’s findings of fact de novo with a presumption of correctness under Tenn. R. 
App. P. 13(d).”64 The courts have elaborated on this point, stating that “[i]n light of 
the heightened burden of proof in [termination of parental rights proceedings], the 
reviewing court must then make its own determination regarding whether the facts, 
either as found by the trial court or as supported by a preponderance of the 
evidence, provide clear and convincing evidence that supports all the elements of 
the termination claim.”65 
Oregon’s current approach is especially interesting. Until recently, Oregon 
provided de novo appellate review of all trial court decisions in equity cases.66 For 
budgetary reasons,67 Oregon’s Legislative Assembly amended section 19.415 to 
make such de novo review discretionary—except in appeals from judgments in 
termination of parental rights cases, where it remains mandatory.68 This distinction 
suggests an implicit legislative finding that appellate review of a trial court’s 
factual findings is particularly crucial where parental rights are at stake. 
The recent changes in Oregon highlight that de novo review is a costly solution. 
Indeed, any increase in appellate scrutiny will come at a cost. Constitutional 
protections always do. 
V. STATUS OF IND. TRIAL RULE 52(A) 
One technical question is whether any possible adjustment to appellate review of 
termination orders would require changes in Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). In pertinent 
part, that rule provides that 
On appeal of claims tried by the court without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, at law or in equity, the court on appeal shall not set aside 
the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
                                                                                                                 
 60.  Heather G., 664 N.W.2d at 497.  
 61.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Nixon v. Karpierz, 105 S.W.3d 487, 488 (Mo. 2003) (en 
banc); In re Marriage of Hayes, 288 S.W.3d 823, 825–26 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); Dallas v. 
Dallas, 670 S.W.2d 535, 538, 540 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). 
 62.  Dallas, 670 S.W.2d at 538. 
 63.  Hayes, 288 S.W.3d at 826.  
 64.  In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010); see also Dept. of Children’s 
Servs. v. Mims, 285 S.W.3d 435, 447 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). 
 65.  Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 596–97. 
 66.  DAVID V. BREWER, CHANGES TO DE NOVO REVIEW IN THE OREGON COURT OF 
APPEALS 2 (OSB Appellate Practice Section CLE 2010). 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  OR. REV. STAT. § 19.415(3)(a), (b) (2009).  
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be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses.69 
Simply treating termination appeals like all other civil appeals would have no 
impact on Rule 52(A). Nor would any related reorganization of the court of 
appeals’ support staff have such an impact. Nor would the (unlikely) alternative of 
giving the Indiana Supreme Court mandatory and exclusive jurisdiction over 
termination appeals under Indiana Appellate Rule 4(A)(1) affect Rule 52(A), since 
the rule does not refer to the court of appeals specifically. 
A good argument can be made that Rule 52(A) offers no obstacle to de novo 
review in termination appeals. A showing of clear error must “leave[] [the court] 
with a firm conviction that a mistake was made.”70 There is nothing about this 
standard necessarily inconsistent with de novo review. (Missouri’s intermediate 
approach, discussed above, allows reversal of a judgment as against the weight of 
the evidence when the reviewing court has “a firm belief that the decree or 
judgment is wrong”71—essentially the clear error standard.) However, reconciling 
de novo review with the clear error standard would require overruling existing case 
law stating that “findings of fact are clearly erroneous if the record lacks any 
evidence or reasonable inferences to support them.”72 In fact, the Indiana Supreme 
Court has recently moved in this direction.73 As noted above, the jurisdictions 
employing de novo review do give some regard, arguably “due regard,” to the trial 
court’s opportunities to judge witness credibility. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 69.  IND. R. TRIAL P. 52(A). 
 70.  Truax v. State, 856 N.E.2d 116, 120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).  
 71.  Dallas v. Dallas, 670 S.W.2d 535, 538 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). 
 72.  In re T.W., 859 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); see also In re Adoption of 
A.S., 912 N.E.2d 840, 851 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).  
 73.  See In re I.A., issued by the October 5, 2010, which noted the requirement of Ind. 
Code § 31-37-14-2 that “[a] finding in a proceeding to terminate parental rights must be 
based upon clear and convincing evidence,” and found that “[t]o construe harmoniously the 
requirements of the statute and Rule 52(A), we hold that to determine whether a judgment 
terminating parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review the trial court's judgment to 
determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the 
findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.” 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132. It should 
be noted that of the fourteen Court of Appeals memorandum decisions issued from October 
6, 2010 to November 23, 2010 affirming termination orders, only one, In re C.O.V., No. 
79A02-1003-JT-445, 2010 WL 4217806, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. October 26, 2010), 
acknowledged the I.A. opinion in any way. Six of these memorandum decisions cited the 
familiar language in In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (discussing the 
“highly deferential standard of review in cases concerning the termination of parental 
rights”). See In re E.Y. and L.Y., No. 54A01-1005-JT-229, 2010 WL 4034914, at *2–3 (Ind. 
Ct. App. October 15, 2010); In re C.H., No. 49A04-1003-JT-201, 2010 WL 4078433, at *2–
3 (Ind. Ct. App. October 19, 2010); In re K.G., No. 02A03-1003-JT-341, 2010 WL 4130929, 
at *2 (Ind. Ct. App. October 21, 2010); In re D.M., Ja.M., & Je.M., No. 20A04-1003-JT-204, 
2010 Ind. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1532, at *7–8 (November 1, 2010); In re S.M., No. 27A04-
1005-JT-266, 2010 WL 4472182, at *2 (Ind. Ct. App. November 9, 2010); In re J.A., No. 
20A03-1004-JT-228, 2010 WL 4600679, at *2 (Ind. Ct. App. November 15, 2010). 
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Of course, it is likely that adoption of de novo review would either be 
accomplished by or followed by amendments to the Indiana Rules of Court. Trial 
Rule 52(A) could be clarified as part of this process. 
CONCLUSION 
The Indiana Court of Appeals does indeed, as it so often states, give special 
deference to trial court decisions to terminate parental rights. However, this 
deference did not result from any considered analysis and raises serious 
constitutional concerns. The similar special treatment of termination appeals under 
the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure potentially aggravates the problem. 
It is time for our courts of review, our rulemaking bodies, and possibly our 
General Assembly to take another look at the appropriate level of appellate scrutiny 
for termination of parental rights and at how best to implement any changes. One 
alternative worth our attention is appellate de novo review. There may be other 
creative solutions, although probably none that come without some increased 
investment of judicial resources. This may be a necessary price to ensure adequate 
protection and respect for the fundamental and constitutionally protected bond 
between parent and child. 
 
